The Difficulty of “Never Again” and Heading off Atrocities in the Moment
It is sometimes easy for us in the United States to sit behind our oceans, relative political stability, and economic prosperity and think all is fine in the world. We often forget that on much of the globe there are horrors occurring that we have the ability to do something about. Some may say, “who are we to intervene in the internal affairs of a sovereign state? Just look at Iraq or Afghanistan and the terrors that came from “American intervention.”[i] In large part they are correct, between destabilizing a whole region and spinning multiple unintended consequences, American foreign intervention does not have a spotless record. America and much of the Western world — a collective block which has the greatest ability, potential, and usually economic capital for doing good — have done a lot of damage in the name of their own national self-interests. Yet there are times when we have done damage or allowed damage and harm to occur by our inaction.
The international system of states is complex and daunting to try to understand. However, by gaining systematic or global understanding, many different theories, or ways of looking at the world emerge, which help us better understand why states and other global actors behave they way that they do, both individually and collectively.[ii] One perspective relies on international laws and organizations to help us both understand and promote cooperation among states. Among these laws, one of the first and most widely ratified among international states is the United Nation’s Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.[iii] However, at the international level, all of these laws in order to be effective, require all states — including powerful actors like the U.S. and other UN Security Council members — to do the morally right thing, especially when it seems inconvenient.
Where does Rwanda come back into this whole situation? For a whole host of reasons, the UN Security Council (either as a block authorizing wider UN intervention or as individual member states) did effectively nothing to intervene or try to stop the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsis. America, in large part, was still reeling from its losses in Somalia due to the events of The Battle of Mogadishu and did not want to get directly militarily involved for fear of a repeat “Black Hawk Down” scenario. It could be argued that at times, due to this inaction or other intentional decisions, these states may have actively facilitated or been complicit in much of the slaughter in Rwanda. Although there was a UN peacekeeping force in Rwanda at this time as part of the 1993 UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), their numbers were repeatedly reduced until there were virtually none left, from 2500 in March 1994 to 270 in late April 1994, and were never given a stronger mandate to protect the civilian population under attack, as they had been previously in Somalia.
Aside from UN peacekeeping, it could be argued that the French government was also complicit in contributing to the violence as it had been supplying, and to some degrees supporting, the Hutu government forces prior to the genocide. During the genocide, the French launched the UNAMIR mandated “humanitarian” Operation Turquoise to create a peaceful zone for fleeing refugees. However, critics argue that it served to facilitate a safe harbor to the genocide perpetrators as they fled the advancing Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF troops) and slowed the acquisition of UNAMIR American-armored personnel carriers (A.P.C.s), which would be used by a coalition to further step in and intervene in the region to stop the violence.[v]
A professor at Utah State once stated that we should, “pity the policy maker.” In many instances, I think we should. When making foreign policy decision, the leaders we choose often have the genuinely daunting task and an insatiable taskmaster (ie., the American public), to whom they are ultimately accountable. In making decisions, they must simultaneously balance the needs of the people they lead, the welfare of their nation, and the obligations of those who have gone before and so much more. Most of the time, there is no ‘right’ answer. To quote the NBC TV show, The West Wing “every once in a while, there's a day with an absolute right and an absolute wrong, but those days almost always include body counts.” It is that ultimate price that leaders and citizens often choose to shy away from.[vi] This is not to say that we must always intervene and fix every issue and problem everywhere, every time we think there is one. However, to again paraphrase The West Wing, “there are times when we're [193 separate countries] and there are times when we're one [global community].”[vii]
If we are to espouse the ideals and moral purposes that we say we do; if we are to truly “never forget” the horror in events like the Holocaust and the Second World War — whose dark events forged the UN and gave meaning to the new word “genocide” —then we must strive to listen to our “better angels.” Despite the difficulties that come, we must hold ourselves to a better, higher standard of international conduct. If we do this, then yes, someday we will be called upon to make a distasteful sacrifice in doing the right thing and leave final judgment to the future to decide what, if any, effect our actions had. But if we do this, if we commit to act, then at least, we can know that we did something rather than stand by and let the innocent be slaughtered yet again. In times of difficulty, making a decision and doing something, doing anything, is so much better than not doing anything at all. What use is remembering something, if we never learn and do not commit to change afterword’s? The only way to ensure that genocide never happens again is for the global community to always, in all instances, intervene and put a stop to it wherever its ugly head may rear. To quote Peter F. Drucker “doing the right thing is more important than doing the thing right.” It’s more important that we make the effort to stop genocide in every instance, even if our efforts may not be the most effective in retrospect. Our common humanity demands that of us.
If then we are able to look past the fluctuation of domestic politics and the foibles of geopolitical indifference there are still some immediate and practical steps that could be taken to better prepare for the, hopefully unlikely, event that another genocide occurs somewhere in the world and needs to be quelled.
It is my opinion that the most effective next step or international deterrence would be to establish a permanent quick reaction force (QRF) of UN troops strictly dedicated to intervening in and stopping mass human rights abuses, specifically genocide and ethnic cleansing. This force consisting of roughly 7-8000 troops would be drawn from all UN member states military but fall in the UN Chain of command separate from these troops home nations and militaries. This QRF would have within it, sufficient equipment to supply, to transport, and to maintain combat effectiveness for a limited time, roughly 3-4 weeks. Its role, once use of sufficient force has been authorized by either the UN General Assembly or UN Security Council, would be primarily to establish a safe enclave, or UN Zone, for victims to flee too. Once this secure UN zone is established the QRF will begin to move to stop further violations of the “Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide”.
This permanent QRF Force may, admittedly, not be sufficient to clear a whole nation of genocide perpetrators, but it should be enough to, at a minimum, establish a safe zone for victims. Secondarily, it should in theory buy time for the rest of the international community to get involved on their own or the UN Security Council to authorize wider use of UN Peacekeepers. It is my opinion that much of the lack luster response on the international scene can be attributed to the lack of will and motivation, and not ability. It is my hope that in creating this UNQRF, its deployment will signal to the international community the seriousness of the situation and drive states to lobby for the Security Council to authorize wider UN forces in the intervention. The world has shown, not only in Rwanda but again and again in places across the globe, an unwillingness to act alone or to act first to stop atrocities in their infancy. Hopefully, by establishing an UNQRF, nations and organizations will have the necessary time and reason (other than the morally righteous cause of stopping a one-sided slaughter) to put an end to genocide and show the world’s true commitment to “never again”.
[i] A) Leoni Connah, “US Intervention in Afghanistan: Justifying the Unjustifiable?,” South Asia Research 41, no. 1 (November 6, 2020): 026272802096460, https://doi.org/10.1177/0262728020964609.
B) SIGAR, “WHAT WE NEED to LEARN: LESSONS from TWENTY YEARS of AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION,” 2021, https://www.sigar.mil/pdf/lessonslearned/SIGAR-21-46-LL.pdf.
[ii] The two theories that are most prevalent are that of “realists” and “liberal internationalists”. (Yes, there is a pantheon of other theories that are valid and relevant and good at what they do in their limited scale, these two however are broadly the most applicable in nearly all instances.) 106-word crash course in International Relations Theory: both “realists” and “liberal internationalists” assume that the international system is inherently anarchial, it is a dog-eat-dog world of survival of the fittest. Realists then assume that because the system is in anarchy, each state is inherently self-interested and will always do what is most relevant for itself and its own interests, power, and survival. Liberal Internationalists say that rather than being merely anarchial, we create international laws and regimes curb anarchy and promote cooperation among states. These laws and regimes create incentivizes for states to work together, or at least not stab each other in the back in a perpetual rat race to the top. Both theories are important to understanding the way the international system reacted the way that it did to the Rwandan Genocide, and why, in large part, it continues to react the way that it does to conflicts across the globe. Much of what we know as international law and many of the longstanding important international organizations were birthed in the years immediately following World War II. In many respects it would appear that Liberal Internationalists won out. That is true that organizations like the United Nations and the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the like have proved incredibly useful and a force for good. Specifically in Rwanda, many UN sub-organizations have given support to the government and other refugees. The ICC, although being established well after the events of the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsis, the ICC played a large role in helping bring about and orchestrating justice for the survivors by prosecuting the perpetrators. And yet in many instances, especially in the moment, when atrocities are occurring organizations are less than stellar at mobilizing to stem the atrocities. A key reason for this is that, under the international system as it is currently designed, is maintain ultimate severity at the state level, and leaving little to no actual power in the hands of the UN and its sub-organizations.
[iii] United Nations. “Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,” December 9, 1948. https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/atrocity-crimes/Doc.1_Convention%20on%20the%20Prevention%20and%20Punishment%20of%20the%20Crime%20of%20Genocide.pdf.
[iv] The UN can only deploy military personnel when there is a UN Security Council resolution authorizing them to do so. Peacekeepers protect civilians, actively prevent conflict, reduce violence, strengthen security and empower national authorities to assume these responsibilities.
A) United Nations, “What We Do,” United Nations Peacekeeping, 2019, https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/what-we-do.
B) Samantha Lakin, “Lessons from the UN Peacekeeping Mission in Rwanda, 25 Years after the Genocide It Failed to Stop,” The Conversation, September 5, 2019, https://theconversation.com/lessons-from-the-un-peacekeeping-mission-in-rwanda-25-years-after-the-genocide-it-failed-to-stop-122174.
[v] A) “Macron Asks Rwanda to Forgive France over 1994 Genocide Role,” BBC News, May 27, 2021, sec. Europe, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-57270099.
B) Chris McGreal, “Chris McGreal on France’s Role in Rwanda,” The Guardian, January 11, 2007, sec. World news, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/jan/11/rwanda.insideafrica.
C) Michael R. Gordon, “U.S. To Supply 60 Vehicles for U.N. Troops in Rwanda,” The New York Times, June 16, 1994, sec. World, https://www.nytimes.com/1994/06/16/world/us-to-supply-60-vehicles-for-un-troops-in-rwanda.html.
D) Cnlg.gov.rw. “Turquoise: Military Operation to the Rescue of the Genocidal Government and Its Army,” June 22, 2020. https://cnlg.gov.rw/index.php?id=87&tx_news_pi1%5Bnews%5D=4292&tx_news_pi1%5Bcontroller%5D=News&tx_news_pi1%5Baction%5D=detail&cHash=0f910a6e5599a9e465db023f4d43a28e.
[vi] “Search or Browse the West Wing Transcripts -- View or Search Transcripts and Summaries,” www.westwingtranscripts.com, accessed May 23, 2022, http://www.westwingtranscripts.com/search.php?flag=getTranscript&id=73.
[vii] “Search or Browse the West Wing Transcripts”